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Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has in many ways altered life and has affected companies.
With all the strains on our economy some companies will survive, and others will not have a
future with the new way of life. There have been some programs to help combat the financial
difficulties being faced by companies, however this may not be enough to save the companies.
These financial difficulties and risks faced due to the pandemic could have effects on the
issuance of going concern opinions, which are issued when there is a concern the business will
not be able to generate positive returns and meets it obligations in the next year. In addition, the
risk of financial misstatements is increased due to the changing business environment and the
changes in the economy that have happened as a result of the pandemic. These changes
interrupted the accounting cycle for many businesses, and they were forced to adapt. All of these
factors cause risk of financial misstatements to increase.
This paper investigates the effects of the pandemic on companies and their ability to
continue and what factors may influence this. Additionally, it investigates the effect of the
pandemic on financial misstatements. Both qualitative and quantitative date will be collected and
analyzed. This data will be collected using Wharton Research Data Services and Audit
Analytics. The data will then be analyzed in excel. The results provide a better understanding of
the economy and how it has been affected. It may also provide insights into what business may
succeed and which ones may struggle in this new environment.
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Literature Review:
Nature of Going Concern Opinions
Statements on Auditing Standards No. 59 gives auditors the responsibility to evaluate if
there is a substantial doubt that an entity will have the ability to continue as a going concern for a
reasonable period of time. Going concern is the accounting term for a company that has the
necessary resources to continue operating. In other words, it means that a company has the
ability to keep their operations going and avoid bankruptcy. These evaluations are made based
on the procedures during the audit as well as knowledge of existing events and conditions that
relate to this assumption. Carson, Fargher, Geiger, Lennox, Raghunandan and Willekens (2013)
find that auditors are more likely to issue going concern opinions when companies are less
profitable, when there is debt default, and when the company has lower liquidity. Companies that
are less profitable have less money to pay off their liabilities or money to continue investing and
growing their business. This can lead to the debt default. Additionally, when the company is not
liquid, they cannot easily obtain cash to pay off their debts leading to a higher risk of bankruptcy
and therefore it will be more likely that a going concern opinion will be issued.
Gallizo and Saladrigues (2016) find that the persistence of losses is a major contributor to
the issuance of a going concern opinion. This puts the continuity of the business at risk. On the
other hand, they find that the more profitable a business is, the lower the probability they will be
issued a going concern opinion as they have no losses and therefore no continuity problems.
Overall, they concluded that the most important indicator to the auditor that there might be a
going concern issue, is the continued existence of losses and the lack of profitability. This relates
to the study discussed above. If there is a repeated history of losses, there is a build up of debt
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that becomes hard and harder to recover from. This would eventually lead to the issuance of a
going concern opinion and potential bankruptcy for the company involved.
Carson et al. (2013) provide the statistics of going concern rates using data obtained
from Audit Analytics. They sampled 88,359 firm-year observations over an eleven-year period
from 2000 to 2010. They found that the overall frequency of going concern opinions increased
from 9.82 percent in 2000 to 13.74 percent in 2001 and 16.57 percent 2002. It is expected that
there would be more going concern opinions issued during this time period due to the economic
issues and the tech bubble. After 2002 there was only a marginal increase in the overall
frequency to 17.01 percent in 2010. Additionally, this study finds that the frequency of going
concern opinions is far greater for companies with market capitalizations under $75 million at a
rate of 36.7 percent. This is compared to a rate of 3.66 percent for companies with a market
capitalization between $75 million and $500 million. For companies with market capitalizations
above $500 million the rate is only 0.33 percent. This indicates that the size of a firm and the
likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion is adversely related.
Further, Carson et al. (2013) found that only 15.71 percent of the firms that were issued
going concern opinions did not file for bankruptcy within a year. This means that it is far more
likely that a company that is issued a going concern opinion will file for bankruptcy than will
not. All of this data shows that a going concern opinion is significantly related to the filing of
bankruptcy within a year of the issuance of the opinion. It also shows that a large and established
company is much less likely to be issued a going concern opinion, whereas start-up type
companies and smaller ones are a lot more likely.
Financial Crisis and Going Concern Opinions
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The financial crisis that took place in 2007 and 2008 generated more interest in the
auditor’s reporting on client facing financial difficulties. Many businesses at this time were
facing increased risks of liquidity as well as credit problems (Carson et al. 2013). This global
financial crisis also drew attention from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). A study by Geiger,
Raghunandan and Riccardi (2014) used data from 414 US companies that were financially
stressed and filed for bankruptcy between 2004 and 2010. They found that “auditors were
significantly more likely to issue a going concern opinion to a subsequently bankrupt company
after” the global financial crisis than in the years before it. They also found that both Big 4 and
non-Big 4 audit firms significantly increased their frequency of issuing going concern opinions
to companies that would soon go bankrupt. Additionally, they found that auditors were more
likely to issue going concern opinions to smaller companies than larger ones after this crisis.
Mareque, López-Corrales and Pedrosa (2017) looked at the financial crisis in Spain in
2008. Going concern is similar in Spain as it is in the United States. Spanish regulations say that
the auditor has to apply the provisions of the Standards on Auditing, meaning that they have to
pay special attention to circumstances that cause doubt to the ability of the firm to continue.
They analyzed reports over four years from 2007 to 2010. The financial crisis led to an increase
in business failures and problems with liquidity and credit. Like what happened in the United
States, this crisis increased the importance of audit reporting and going concern reporting. In
2010 Spain issued the Green Paper Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis. This Green Paper
states that “auditors exercise ‘a social and public interest function, absolutely fundamental in a
democratic economic and political system,’ and underlines the importance of audit reports for
interested third parties” (Mareque et al. 2017).
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This study cites prior research, Cheffers, Whalen, and Sielis (2011), from the US stock
exchange that going concern reports rose from 14.4% in 2003 to 21% in 2008 and 19.4% in 2009
as well as 18.5% in 2010. The main causes of the increases were identified as recurring loss,
working capital/current ratio inadequacy, and absence of significant revenues. Mareque et al.
(2017) found that reports with going concern issues rose from 2.25% in 2007 to 6.77% in 2008
and 8.5% in 2009. There was a slight fall in 2010 to 7.25%. They also found that in 2009 12.5%
of the firms who referenced a going concern opinion filed for bankruptcy in 2010, and 7.81% of
the firms did not present an audit report because they did not meet the requirements established
in the Law on Auditing of Accounts. These requirements in Spain include if annual turnover is
less than 5.7 million, the workforce is less than 50, and total assets are less than 2.85 million
(Accounting and Accounting Rules in Spain 2020). There was also no information on 12.5% of
the firms. They say that it is important to note that more than half the firms that filed for
bankruptcy in 2010 did not have a mention of going concern which leads the work of the auditor
to be called into question (Mareque et al. 2017). This is different from the conclusions drawn by
Carson et al. (2013) who site the importance of auditors. This could partly be due to the fact that
these studies took place in different countries with different standards.
These two studies highlight the impact that financial distress can have on the issuing of
going concern opinions. The increased financial pressure leads to lower liquidity, lower revenue,
and therefore an increased risk that the business will not be able to continue. This eventually
leads to bankruptcy or at least a much worse financial situation. In both cases the percentage of
going concern opinions being issued increase for several years before decreasing. As expected,
there was also an increase in bankruptcy filings.
Impacts of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion
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Carson et al. (2013) found that 60.10 percent of firms that were issued going concern
opinions went bankrupt before the next audit. They also found that 61 percent of auditors
indicated that an issuance of a going concern opinion could cause unwarranted problems for a
company. According to Geiger, Raghunandan, and Riccardi (2014) there is something that exists
known as the “self-fulling” prophecy. This relates to the belief that if a going concern opinion is
issued it may exacerbate the problems that the company is having. Many auditors are reluctant to
issue these opinions for fear that it will increase the likelihood that the company will file for
bankruptcy. However, auditors should not be reluctant to issue a going concern opinion. They
should just increase their testing and check their work to ensure the issuance is warranted.
Vanstraelen (2003) looks at going concern opinions and the self-fulfilling prophecy. Of the 1,176
companies they surveyed, 17% received a going concern opinion. Of the 17%, only 27%
survived the first year. With this data, and other data collected, they concluded that the initial and
repeated going concern opinions increase the likelihood of bankruptcy. The study also finds that
companies who survive a going concern opinion are significantly more likely to switch auditors
in the following year.
Continuing with auditor switching as a consequence for the issuance of a going concern
opinion, a study by Carey, Geiger, and O’Connell (2008) speaks to just that issue. This study
took place in Australia and finds that companies that receive a going concern opinion for the first
time are more likely to switch auditors than companies in a similar financial situation that did not
receive a going concern opinion. They find that ten of the sixty companies that issued a going
concern opinion and remained viable switched auditors within a year. In addition, they found that
smaller firms were more likely to switch auditors which is consistent with prior research. Finally,
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they found no evidence that Australian companies by “a Big 5 firm are significantly less likely to
switch auditors than companies audited by non-Big 5 firms” (Carey et al. 2008).
Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2017) found that capital markets respond negatively to a going
concern opinion. They found that firms receiving these opinions continue to experience
significant negative abnormal returns for the month following the announcement. These negative
returns increase the bankruptcy risk which relates to the study discussed earlier. In some cases,
these negative returns may not be as bad after the announcement if it was not a surprise. This
means that if the announcement was inevitable the more severe market reactions would occur
before the official announcement as opposed to after.
Ruiz-Barbadillo and Guiral (2019) draw similar conclusions to the findings above. They
discuss that it is important to control the stakeholder’s prior expectations when looking at the
information that is conveyed through a going concern opinion. In many instances a going
concern opinion can be predicted due to several financial distress indicators. These indicators
should be able to tell a reasonable stakeholder that the company may not be able to continue for
the next twelve months. Therefore, the opinion should just be confirming a pattern of the
financial deterioration and not adding significant information. It can then be concluded that a
stakeholder’s reaction to the announcement will be dependent on the probability that it will
occur. If the likelihood of bankruptcy is low based on financial distress indicators, investors
would not anticipate the issuance of going concern opinions. When they are issued investors
would react strongly and negatively, reducing the value of the companies. Whether or not this
information is expected, it can be concluded that there will be a negative market reaction of some
type.
Going Concerns and the COVID-19 pandemic
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The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the world and has changed life as we know in for
at least the short-term. One of the biggest fallouts has been the financial strains and pressures put
on companies. This is in part due to customers being confined to their homes due to mandatory
orders to shelter in place and the forced closure of non-essential businesses. Additionally, with
the unemployment rate rising, there is less disposable income to be spent. According to
Accounting Today, many corporate executives will have to consider their ability to generate
sufficient cash flow that would support their operations. In particular, it will be important to
consider whether companies can maintain compliance with debt covenants. Auditors will have to
take these facts into consideration and will have to put extra focus on the estimates and
judgments supporting managements decisions (Hines and Giese 2020).
In an article published by the accounting firm BDO, they discuss the impact of the
pandemic on companies and specifically the issuance of going concern opinions. Under GAAP,
entities are required to consider going concern and auditors are tasked with evaluating this
ability. With the impacts of the pandemic this will become exponentially harder. This article says
that “significant judgment will be required as no two entities’ fact patterns, even if operating in
the same industry, will be the same. At the end of the day, it will come back to one central
question – will the company have sufficient cash flows to meet its existing obligations and
alleviate any conditions that raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going
concern.” The COVID-19 pandemic has made evaluating this an even more significant challenge
(BDO 2020).
Deloitte, one of the Big 4 accounting firms, published an article entitled “Financial;
Reporting Considerations Related to COVID-19 and an Economic Downturn.” This article
discusses the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting major financial and economic
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markets. It cites in particular several industries that were severely affected: travel, hospitality,
retail, and leisure. Entities, especially ones in these industries, will need to consider whether they
will have the ability to continue within one year of the date on their interim or annual financial
statements. The pandemic has put immense pressures on entities and going concern opinions.
They now have to consider their unique circumstances and their specific risk exposure in order to
analyze how the recent events will affect financial reporting. Overall, going concern will have to
be assessed carefully and with “well-reasoned judgements” due to the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic (Deloittee 2020).
The severity of the pandemic will be mitigated in the short run in some cases. A specific
case of this is the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) act as well as
funding that is available through a loan program with the Small Business Administration (SBA).
The CARES act will provide a source of external funding for management to keep their
businesses running. According to the SEC, it delays certain payroll taxes until 2021 and 2022, as
well as eliminating certain net operating losses, permitting carrybacks of net operating losses,
accelerating the refund schedule for alternative minimum tax credits, and increasing the
percentage of taxable income that can be offset with deductions of interest expense. The SBA
will provide money to the most qualifying small businesses in order to cover payroll as well as
interest on mortgage payments, rent, and utility for the covered time of the loan. If the loan is
used as intended with the program, it will be forgiven. According to the Journal of Accountancy,
these efforts may not be enough to alleviate the substantial doubt around going concern.
Financial Misstatements and the Consequences
Financial misstatements occur when there are differences between amounts,
classifications, presentation, or disclosure of an item and what is reported on the financial
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statements. These misstatements are material when the items on the financial statements are
incorrect to the point that it will influence the decisions of the users. There are several effects to
the restating company when a misstatement is issued, the first dealing with the consequences to
managers after committing GAAP violations. Managers are typically responsible for internal
controls and because of the fallout from a restatement, managers take the blame. Results in a
study by Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) showed that earnings restatements are extremely
costly for managers of the restating companies. In this study they sampled 146 firms that
announced restatements between 1997 and 1998. They found that at least one senior manager,
either a Chairman, CEO, or President, lost their job within 24 months of the announcement. This
was the case in 60 percent of the firms studied. The standard rate of turnover for firms is 35
percent. This shows a big gap in the percentages even after accounting for other factors like
management turnover, performance, and bankruptcy.
Another study examined the effect the accounting restatements on the cost of capital and
expected future earnings (Hribar and Jenkins 2004). Through this study they found that, for the
restating company, there are both reductions in future earnings and increases in the cost of
capital leading to a significant loss in market value. They found that for restating companies in
the month immediately following the restatement there was, on average, an increase in the cost
of equity between 7 percent and 19 percent. They also estimated that there was an increase in the
estimated cost of capital by 7.65 percent.
Additionally, when examining the stock price of the restating company, the study showed
that the biggest decline in price occurs within five days of the announcement of the restatement.
Twenty-five percent of the companies observed loss more than 16 percent of their market value
over this period to time. After this initial reaction, the returns typically remain flat for the next
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60 days. This suggests that the initial reaction was not an overreaction. After these restatements
there was also repercussions for the forecasted earnings. For the companies observed there was
an average reduction in the one-year ahead forecasts of approximately 14.7 percent. There was a
similar result with the two-year ahead forecasts of earnings with the average downward revision
being 7.8 percent. This shows that some of the effect of the restatement dissipates, but there is a
long-term market effect to the restating company (Hribar, P., et al. 2004).
Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang (2006) examines the accounting fraud at a public
company, ComROAD AG, and one of the biggest international auditors, KPMG. The scandal
studied involved recognizing false revenues. On February 19, 2002 KPMG effectively resigned
as auditor by declining its mandate as auditor. KPMG stated that there were justified doubts
about the trustworthiness of ComROAD. As news came out about the fictitious reporting or
revenues made by ComROAD, KPMG was in damage control mode. They announced that they
would re-audit some of its clients in order to affirm their credibility. Additionally, it was found
that KPMG’s rate of dismissals doubles in 2002 versus the year before. In 2002 the rate was
found to be 15.7% versus an average of 7.7% for the three prior years.
Chancey and Kirk (2002) researched the impact the Enron audit failure had on their
auditor’s reputation, who at the time was Arthur Andersen. As mentioned earlier, an auditor’s
reputation is very much related to how they are perceived by the outside world. Once the auditor
quality is jeopardized there is a lower level of assurance that the financial statements actually
reflect the reality of company. A brief background on Enron begins with the fact that it used to
be the seventh largest firm in the United States in terms of revenues and was seen as being very
innovative. It all changed on October 16, 2001, when Enron announced that their third-quarter
earnings were going to include a nonrecurring charge of $1.01 billion due to accounting errors.
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After this the Securities and Exchange Commission began to formally investigate Enron’s
accounting. On October 22 Enron stock dropped 20 percent and from there everything continued
to spiral downwards. They had understated debt by $711 million in 1997 and $628 million in
2000. Enron proceeded to dismiss Arthur Anderson.
This is an extreme case, but it works well to show the effect of fraud and restatement on
the auditor’s other clients. Their study showed that on average Arthur Anderson’s clients, other
than Enron, lost on average $37.1 million over the three days following the announcement.
While some of their clients did not experience this severe loss, most did. The biggest loss came
for other clients that were audited by the same Arthur Anderson office as Enron was. When it
comes to rates of dismissal, only 13 clients in their sample left Arthur Anderson before the
indictment date, although this is partly due to the fact that 71 percent of the firms use December
as a year-end basis. Due to this fact, it is unlikely a lot of these firms would switch in the middle
year due to the high cost of obtaining a new auditor of the clients that dismissed Arthur
Anderson. There was a strong negative correlation between the size of the firm and the time at
which they switched auditors. This study was able to relate these losses directly with the loss of
reputation for their auditor.
Overall, there can be several consequences from a financial misstatement. These
consequences can include the firing of senior managers and an increased rate of turnover as well
as an increase in the cost of capital and a decrease in future expected earnings. Going along with
this, there may be a decrease in the stock price of the restating companies. These impacts can be
shown in several case studies like the ComROAD and Enron cases discussed above.
Financial Misstatements and the Pandemic
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The COVID-19 pandemic has affected many different areas in business, including
financial misstatements. The Journal of Accountancy draws attention to the fact that several
different areas in accounting, specifically in preparing financial statements, require estimates. It
is important that these estimates are appropriate and that stakeholders can depend on them and
trust them. These estimates can be associated with revenue recognition, allowance for doubtful
accounts, and other similar accounts. These particular accounts are already at risk for financial
misstatements, but that risk is especially heightened due to the pandemic. A manufacturing
company can be used as an example for this. Companies typically set a percentage of their credit
sales that they estimate will be uncollectable. COVID has the potential to impact the ability of
customers to pay off their account. This will result in the estimate of uncollectable accounts
needing to be adjusted and could result in a financial misstatement (Dohrer 2020).
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission also issued a statement regarding
COVID-19. In the SEC’s statement they draw similar conclusions to the findings above. They
acknowledge that the pandemic has drastically impacted businesses of types resulting in issues
that will inevitably affect financial reporting. Financial misstatements will be a big part of this
due to changes in businesses and additional uncertainties that the pandemic has caused. Another
fact that the article points out is that having to change internal controls and the lack of effective
ones may also contribute to an increased risk of financial misstatement. Having to change
operations to a work at home operation could have caused internal controls to be not as effective
or make them harder to enforce and could have created a need for more. An example of this
would be an increased need for data security controls. Problems with internal controls can also
be a reason for a misstatement later (SEC 2020).
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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board had conversations with audit
committee chairs relating to COVID-19 and the auditing profession. This was touched on briefly
by the previous article, but the PCAOB sites cyber-related risks such as email security and
phishing attempts, at major sources of risk due to the shift to working from home. There is less
security involved with working from home as well as less internal controls. This gap in
technology has the potential to leave the door open to more errors and fraud. It is necessary for
these risks to be considered when assessing the likelihood of a material misstatement of the
financial statements (PCAOB 2020).
Research Questions and Predictions:
This study will examine how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the issuance of going
concern opinions as well as the likelihood of financial misstatements. The specific research
questions are:
•

Compared to previous years, has the issuance of going concern opinions and the
likelihood of financial restatements changed during the COVID-19 pandemic?

•

How does the impact on going concern opinions and financial restatements during the
pandemic compare to those during the financial crisis?

•

How does the size of a company impact the likelihood of a going concern opinion and
financial restatements during the COVID-19 pandemic?

•

Have certain industries experienced more going concern opinions or financial
restatements than others due to the COVID-19 pandemic?

Predictions:
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It is expected that the pandemic has resulted in an increase in going concern opinions and
financial restatements, particularly in smaller companies and in industries that have been hit
hard, like the retail industry. Some of this was shown during the financial crisis in different
companies and industries, but with the COVID pandemic being unlike anything seen before it is
expected that some of the results will differ.
Methodology:
In this study secondary data will be used. This data will be sourced using several tools,
the first being Audit Analytics, an independent research provider giving access to audit and
accounting related information. Another tool that will be used to collect secondary data is the
SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR). It is the primary
system for companies to submit documents and therefore contains millions of company fillings.
These tools will provide qualitative and quantitative data on companies regarding their filings.
This study will also use Wharton School’s database, WRDS, to access companies financial
statement information. Once the data is collected it can be analyzed and cleaned using Excel.
Results and Discussion:
Going Concern and Financial Restatements During COVID-19 Pandemic
Table 1 presents the breakdown of going concern opinions issued by accounting firm. It
presents going concern data from April of 2020 to September 2020. Comparison data from 2014
to 2018 over the same months of the year is also presented. For 2020, there were 2641
observations, of which 373 had going concern opinions attached to them resulting in a
percentage of 14.1%. This is compared to an average going concern rate of 16.45% from 20102018. Looking at this data further, there is a higher percentage of going concern opinions issued
from Big 4 auditors than in previous years. Previous years had between 54% and 58% of going
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concern opinions coming from smaller audit firms, while in 2020 smaller firms account for only
41%. All the Big 4 accounting firms increased the percentage of going concern opinions they
issued in 2020, compared to previous years. This is more representative of what is happening in
the economy than what is shown from the smaller audit firms. The lower rates in smaller firms
could also be because they typically face more pressure. Big accounting firms have a more
diversified client portfolio and more bargaining power and are therefore, not afraid to issued
going concern opinions (Read & Yezegel, 2016).
Financial restatements that were announced from April 2020 to August 2020 were also
analyzed. The data can be found in Table 2. There were 152 observations of financial
restatements. Of these, 124 were adverse resulting in a percentage of 81.58%. 50 of these
observations came from companies audited by a Big 4 accounting firm with other large firms
like BDO and Grant Thornton account for another 20 and 9, respectively. 17.11% of the
companies that issued a financial restatement switched auditors. Additionally, 76.9% of the
companies that switched had adverse financial restatements. This can be compared to financial
restatements from 2014 to 2018 using the same part of the year as is observed in 2020. Data in
2020 compares similarly to the previous years. The article, “Reacting to COVID-19 in internal
control over financial reporting”, written and published by Deloitte points out that there are
several effects of the pandemic that will result in internal control complications. One example of
this is changes in current technology that are delayed. Companies had to change the way they
worked very quickly. This left them susceptible to risk as their current technology and internal
controls did not immediately support the new way of working caused because of the pandemic.
Comparison of Going Concern Opinions and Restatements in the COVID Pandemic vs. the
Financial Crisis Periods
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The Financial Crisis is the period commonly defined as from 2007 to 2008. This period
of financial difficulties was partly sparked by the collapse of the US housing market. The
economic problems facing the country now were caused by the global pandemic leading to
businesses shutting down and higher unemployment rates. Comparing going concern opinions
during these two time periods will provide interesting insights into the current economic impact
of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Table 3 presents data on going concern opinions from the Financial Crisis. Starting with
the data from 2007, there were 947 going concern opinions issued and 4142 total opinions for a
percentage of 17.6%. 57.8% of the going concern opinions came from smaller accounting firms.
In 2008 there were 965 going concern opinions with 4018 total opinions issued, resulting in a
percentage of 24%. The percentage of opinions from smaller firms was 40.8%. Compared to the
current data from the COVID-19 pandemic, the going concern percentage rate is higher.
Additionally, it is interesting that the going concern opinions filed by smaller companies
decreases by over 15% from 2007 to 2008. The 57.8% is closer to what is seen in comparison
years, while the 40.8% from 2008 is very close to what is being seen in 2020. More research can
be done in the future to see if this percentage decreases more with the fallout from the pandemic.
It is expected that results during the Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic will differ as
both affected different areas of the economy. The financial crisis was worsened due to the
housing crisis which helped to spark the economic downturn. The pandemic on the other hand
affected the healthcare industries and business/services that profited from in-person interactions,
like restaurants, cruises, airlines, etc. Another interesting point about the date is that there is a
high percentage of going concern opinions from BDO and McGladrey in 2007 and 2008, but
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much lower in 2020. This could be reflective of a change in clientele as both firms went through
mergers after that time. It could also be as a result of company culture and leadership changes.
Financial restatements during 2007 and 2008 were also analyzed. Table number 4
presents this data. It was collected using the same time period of the year as was used when
analyzing data during 2020 in order to provide an accurate comparison. In 2007 there were 604
restatements with 546 being adverse for a percentage of 90.4%. Additionally, 30.6% of the
companies that issued a restatement switched auditors. In 2008 there were 402 restatements with
369 being adverse for a percentage of 91.8% with 33.8% of the companies switching auditors.
These results are relatively similar to what is being seen during the pandemic, however, with the
financial crisis there is a higher percentage of companies with adverse restatements and
companies that switched auditors. As mentioned earlier, it is expected the financial crisis would
show more severe results at this point. It takes several years for financial restatements to show so
more research can be done in the future to see if there is more of an economic impact from the
COVID-19 pandemic in the future.
Size and Industry Findings
Table 5 presents industry data for 2020. Industry is defined using two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. There were 860 companies that had audit opinions with
industry information. Of these, 53 were issued going concern opinions. The industries with the
most going concern opinions issued were Chemicals and Allied Products, Business Services, and
Metal Mining. Some of the industries that saw no going concern opinions included Security and
Commodity Brokers, Insurance Carriers, and Automotive Dealers and Service Stations. These
results are to be expected. The Chemicals and Allied Products includes industries that would
have had to pivot and change production in order to accommodate demand, an example would be
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drug and pharmaceutical companies. Additionally, the pharmaceuticals and drug industries are
inherently risky before you factor in the pandemic. In these company’s 10-ks they cite problems
with supply chains, work from home orders, and delays in their rollout of new products as
reasons for the going concern opinions. The companies that do not mention the pandemic
mention things like continuous negative returns. The industries with no going concern opinions
were not ones that stand out as being affected by the pandemic. The COVID-19 was not the only
reason for the going concern opinions, but it was a factor that companies had to consider when
issuing their financial statements.
In addition to industry, the size of the company was also analyzed to see if there was a
correlation in whether a smaller company is more likely to have a going concern opinion issued.
Size was based on market capitalization on 1/1/2021. There were 787 companies in the time
period analyzed during the pandemic. From Table 6, it is clear to see there is a trend in the data.
As the company size increases there are less going concern opinions issued. This is expected as
smaller companies are generally riskier. They typically do not have as much cash on hand and
are not as established giving them a greater risk of bankruptcy. When looking at the annual
reports, not every company states the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor in the going concern
opinion. For the ones that do, there are several reasons that they cite. Sunwin Stevia
International, Inc mentions interruptions of supply chains, CEL-SCI Corporation says COVID19 will have a material adverse effect on their business plan, and Predictive Technology Group,
Inc mentions delays in the launch of a product due to the pandemic leading to impairment
changes.
Industry and size data was also analyzed for financial restatements during the COVID-19
pandemic. Industry data can be found in Table 7 and size data in Table 8. The industry with the
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highest number of restatements was Chemicals and Allied products, followed by Business
Services, and Industrial Machinery and Equipment. The Chemicals and Allied products industry
include drugs and cleaning supplies, which were in such high demand during the pandemic. I
conject that these companies had to pivot and adjust and devoted their resources to production
hence weakening internal controls and increasing their risks for financial misstatements. The
industries with the least numbers of restatements were Transportation Equipment, Water
Transportation, and Mining. The data seems to suggest similar industries resulting in a higher
number of opinions issued and more restatements. This may be because when a company is in
financial distress the risk if a financial restatement increase. The likelihood of a financial
restatement also seems to be correlated to size, however, with the small sample size for the
number of restatements drawing a conclusion on the trend is somewhat speculative.
Limitations
There are some limitations to this data. The pandemic is still very recent and the effects
of it are ongoing, because of this there is not a lot of data within the timeframe available. This
makes the results less reliable. It is also likely that the economic fallout from the pandemic will
not be immediate. The government is providing many subsidies for the things like rent as well as
providing extra money for unemployment and stimulus checks. These things are helping to keep
the economy afloat, but when they stop there may be a bigger fallout than is currently being
seen.
Conclusion
While the data analyzed does have some limitations, it also provides some interesting
insights. The data shows an increased going concern opinion percentage from 2018 to 2020. It is
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evident from observing some of the company’s annual reports that the COVID-19 pandemic
played a role in this, but it cannot be concluded that it was the reason for all the going concern
opinions issued. While the financial restatement data did not show a clear impact from the
pandemic, financial statement data takes longer to become available and could be an area for
future research. Comparing this data to the financial crisis provided further insight into the data.
The two time periods had different effects on the economy, but there were similarities. Both
periods had an increased percentage of going concern opinions from larger accounting firms as
well as an increased overall going concern percentage rate.
The data set regarding industry and size was smaller than the original, but still showed
interesting results. The industry data show similar industries affected the most for both going
concern opinions and financial restatements. One of the top industries affect was Chemicals and
Allied Materials. It might be expected that pharmaceutical companies were able to benefit from
the spotlight on the healthcare industry, when in fact the data shows they did not go unharmed.
The size data showed a clear picture that as the size of the company increases, the likelihood of a
going concern opinion decrease. This trend was also shown for financial restatements, but due to
the small sample size those results may not be as accurate. More research can be done in the
future to determine more of the long-term effects the COVID-19 pandemic has on the economy.
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Table 1: Going Concern Opinions During COVID-19 Pandemic

Firm (By
Revenue in
2020)
Deloitte &
Touche LLP
Pricewaterhouse
Coopers LLP
Ernst & Young
LLP
KPMG LLP
RSM US LLP
Grant Thornton
LLP
BDO USA LLP
Moss Adams
LLP
CohnReznick
LLP
Total of Smaller
Firms
Total

2014
Going
Total
Concern Opinions
Opinions
5

717

%

0.7%

2015
Going
Total
Concern Opinions
Opinions
2

671

2016
2017
Going
Total
%
Going
Total
Concern Opinions
Concern Opinions
Opinion
Opinions
s
0.3%
2
668 0.3%
5
677
%

%

0.7%

2018
Going
Total
Concern Opinions
Opinions
2

657

%

2020
Going
Total
Concern Opinions
Opinions

0.3%

%

604

1.0%

330

1.2%

218

1.8%

6
1

379

0.3%

1

348

0.3%

5

332 1.5%

4

337

1.2%

3

339

0.9%
4

2

309

0.6%

4

247

1.6%

3

239 1.3%
279 2.5%
35 5.7%
722 0%

4

1
0
2

274
1
850

0.4%
0.0%
0.2%

3
0
0

286
24
815

1.0%
0%
0%

7
2
0

2
1
1

4
1

44
8

9.1%
12.5%

3
0

50
8

6.0%
0%

0
0

32
8

0%
0%

9
0

6 33.33%

0

4

0%

0

4

0%

1

246
259
34
671

1.6%

7

236
235
37
617

3.0%

0.8%
2.9%
0.1%

2
1
2

0.9%
2.7%
0.3%

49 18.4%
10
0%

7
1

41 17.1%
15 6.7%

2

6 33.3%

4
5
0
6
3

168 2.98%
25 0.0%
422 1.4%
30
11

10%
0.0%

6

0.0%

0
2

4

25%

0
627
645

1074
3662

58.4%
17.6%

553
566

947 58.4%
3400 16.6%

480
499

870 55.2
%
3189 15.6
%

430

792 54.3%

375

744 50.4%

827 41.7%
345

457

3075 14.9%

402

2927 13.7%

2641 14.1%
373

This table presents data from April 2020 to September 2020 on going concern opinions issued. It also represents data from 2014 to 2018 over the
same period of the year for comparison purposes. The firms are listed in order of revenue in 2020. The three columns for each year represent the
number of going concern opinions issued, the total number of opinions issued, and then a percentage calculated by dividing going concern
opinions by total opinions to give the going concern issuance percentage rate.
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Table 2: Financial Restatement Data During COVID-19 Pandemic
2014
2015
2016
2017
Restatements
365
337
294
262
Adverse Restatements
307
277
250
208
Total Auditor Changes
57
85
72
51
Auditor Changes with
Adverse Restatements
51
68
61
34
Adverse Percentage
84.1%
82.2%
85.0%
79.4%
Auditor Changes
Percentage
15.6%
25.2%
24.5%
19.5%

2018
237
191

2020
152
124

43

26

35
80.6%

20
81.6%

18.1%

17.1%

This table shows financial restatement data from April 2020 to September 2020 as well as data from 2014
to 2018 over the same part of the year. The first row represents the number of financial restatements. The
second row is adverse restatements. The third row is the number of companies that switched auditors. The
fourth row is the number of companies that had both adverse restatements and changed auditors. The
adverse percentage is calculated as adverse restatements divided by total restatements. The auditor
changes percentage is calculated as auditor changes divided by restatements.

Table 3: Going Concern Opinions During 2007 and 2008 Financial Crisis
2007
2008
Going
Total
%
Going
Total
Concern Opinions
Concern Opinions
Opinions
Opinions
6
695 0.9%
3
740

2020
Going
Total
Concern Opinions
Opinions
0.4%
6
604
%

%

Firm
Deloitte & Touche
1.0%
LLP
PricewaterhouseCoop
5
398 1.3%
6
365 1.6%
4
330 1.2%
ers LLP
Ernst & Young LLP
5
474 1.1%
8
438 1.8%
4
218 1.8%
KPMG LLP
4
317 1.3%
9
265 3.4%
5
168 3.0%
McGladrey & Pullen
5
31 16.1%
7
32 21.9%
0
25 0.0%
LLP/RSM USA LLP
Grant Thornton LLP
4
585 0.7%
5
621 0.8%
6
422 1.4%
BDO Seidman
7
59 11.9%
14
52 26.9%
3
30 10.0%
LLP/BDO USA LLP
Moss Adams LLP
0
8 0%
0
6
0%
0
11 0.0%
CohnReznick LLP
0
0 0%
0
0
0%
0
6 0.0%
Total of Smaller
911
1575 57.8%
913
2239 40.8%
345
827 41.7%
Firms
Total
947
4142 17.6%
965
4018 24.0%
373
2641 14.1%
This table presents data from 2007 and 2008 using the same part of the year as was used for the pandemic
calculations, April through September. The columns represent the number of going concern opinions
issued, the total number of opinions issued, and the percentage is calculated by dividing going concern
opinions issued by total opinions.
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Table 4: Financial Restatements during 2007 and 2008 Financial Crisis

Restatements
Adverse Restatements
Total Auditor Changes
Auditor Changes with
Adverse Restatements
Adverse Percentage
Auditor Changes
Percentage

2007
604
546

2008

2020
402
369

152
124

185

136

26

159
90.4%

123
91.8%

20
81.6%

30.6%

33.8%

17.1%

This table shows restatement data from 2007 and 2008 over the same part of the year as analyzed for the
COVID-19 pandemic. The first row represents the number of financial restatements. The second row is
adverse restatements. The third row is the number of companies that switched auditors. The fourth row is
the number of companies that had both adverse restatements and changed auditors. The adverse
percentage is calculated as adverse restatements divided by total restatements. The auditor changes
percentage is calculated as auditor changes divided by restatements.

Table 5: Industry Data for Going Concern Opinions
Industry

Going Concern Opinions

Total Opinions

Percentage

Apparel and Accessory Stores

1

1

100.0%

Furniture and Home furnishing Stores

1

1

100.0%

Pipelines, Except Natural Gas

1

1

100.0%

Services, NEC

1

1

100.0%

Social Services
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products

1
1

1
1

100.0%
100.0%

Motion Pictures
Transportation Services

5
5

6
7

83.3%
71.4%

Paper and Allied Products
Metal Mining

2
26

3
40

66.7%
65.0%

Personal Services
Coal Mining

6
10

10
17

60.0%
58.8%

4

7

57.1%

16

29

55.2%

Non-depository Institutions

4

8

50.0%

Agricultural production- livestock

1

2

50.0%

Agricultural services

1

2

50.0%

Health Services
Miscellaneous Retail

28
Building Materials and Garden Supplies

1

2

50.0%

Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service

1

2

50.0%

Communications

3

7

42.9%

Engineering and Management Services

7

18

38.9%

Business Services

43

116

37.1%

Chemicals and Allied Products

44

121

36.4%

Amusement and Recreation Services

5

14

35.7%

Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries

3

9

33.3%

Heavy Contractors

1

3

33.3%

Trucking and Warehousing

1

3

33.3%

Holding and Other Investment Offices

4

13

30.8%

Instruments and Related Products

12

47

25.5%

Real Estate

6

24

25.0%

Printing and Publishing

3

12

25.0%

Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products

2

8

25.0%

Food Stores

1

4

25.0%

Gerneral Merchandise Stores

1

4

25.0%

Hotels and Other Lodging Places

1

4

25.0%

Special Trade Contractors

1

4

25.0%

Transportation by Air

1

4

25.0%

Transportation Equipment

4

18

22.2%

Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services

3

15

20.0%

Agricultural production- crops

1

5

20.0%

Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods

3

16

18.8%

12

65

18.5%

Furniture and Fixtures

1

6

16.7%

Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods

2

13

15.4%

Industrial Machinery and Equipment

5

33

15.2%

Food and Kindred Products

2

22

9.1%

Eating and Drinking Places

1

11

9.1%

Educational Services

1

13

7.7%

Depository Institutions

1

31

3.2%

Apparel and Other Textile Products

0

1

0.0%

Automotive Dealers and Service Stations

0

7

0.0%

Fabricated Metal Products

0

7

0.0%

Foreign Governments

0

1

0.0%

General Building Contractors

0

3

0.0%

Insurance Carriers

0

4

0.0%

International Affairs

0

2

0.0%

Leather & Leather Products

0

1

0.0%

Lumber and Wood Products

0

1

0.0%

Electronic and Other Electric Equipment

29
Miscellaneous Repair Services

0

1

0.0%

Nonmetallic Minerals

0

2

0.0%

Petroleum and Coal Products

0

1

0.0%

Primary Metal Industries

0

5

0.0%

Security and Commodity Brokers

0

18

0.0%

Textile Mill Products

0

2

0.0%

This table shows industry data during the COVID-19 pandemic. The first column lists the industries,
classified by the two digit SIC code. The second column is the number of going concern opinions and the
third is the total number of opinions. The third column is calculated as going concern opinions/total
opinions.

Table 6: Company Size Data for COVID-19 Pandemic
Total Opinions

Avg Size by Market Cap

157
157
157
157
159

11 Million
68 Million
255 Million
1 Billion
53 Billion

Going Concern
Opinions
113
53
37
14
5

%
72.0%
33.8%
23.6%
8.9%
3.1%

This table shows company size data from April 2020 to September 2020. The first column the number of
opinions in each size range. The second shows the average size calculated as price per share times
outstanding shares. The third column shows the number of going concern opinions in the size range and
the fourth shows the percentage calculated as going concern opinions divided by total opinions.
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Table 7: 2020 Industry Data for Financial Restatements

Industry

2020 Restatement Industry Data
Restatements

Chemicals and Allied Products
Business Services
Industrial Machinery and Equipment
Coal Mining
Depository Institutions
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment
Food Stores
Instruments and Related Products
Apparel and Other Textile Products
Eating and Drinking Places
Engineering and Management Services
Health Services
Holding and Other Investment Offices
Insurance Carriers
Motion Pictures
Printing and Publishing
Real Estate
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products
Transportation Equipment
Water Transportation
Mining
Total

Adverse
Restatements
5
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
35

This table shows the number of restatements by industry as well as the number of adverse restatements by
industry. Industry is defined using the two digit SIC code.

4
3
4
2
2
3
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
31
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Table 8: 2020 Size Data for Financial Restatements

Total Opinions

Avg Size by
Market Cap
157
157
157
157
159

11 Million
68 Million
255 Million
1 Billion
53 Billion

Going
Concern
Opinions
113
53
37
14
5

%

72.0%
33.8%
23.6%
8.9%
3.1%

# of
Restatements
0
4
2
1
0

This table shows size, calculated as price per share on 9/04/2020 times current shares outstanding, restatements
during the COVID-19 pandemic.

